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Note 
Inter Partes Review: Ensuring Effective Patent 
Litigation Through Estoppel 
Ann E. Motl* 
 
“We have identified your company as one that appears to 
be using [our] patented technology, and we are contacting you 
to initiate discussions regarding your need for a license.”
1
 An 
increasing number of companies and individual consumers 
have received such infringement letters,
2
 which typically con-
clude with a demand for a license specially calculated to per-
suade potential defendants to enter into a license.
3
 Because of 
the exorbitant expenses associated with patent litigation and 
the potential for a devastating adverse judgment,
4
 many com-
panies have been coerced into entering a license, whether or 
not they believe they actually infringe a valid patent.
5
 Taking 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.M.E. 
2012, University of St. Thomas. I would like to thank Michael T. Hawkins for 
introducing me to this topic. I also thank Professor Ruth Okediji for her advice 
and comments during the drafting of this Note. Thanks to the members 
of Minnesota Law Review who helped with the publication of my Note and 
thank you to all of my Law Review friends for making the past two years so 
enjoyable. Finally, thank you to my family for their continuing support in law 
school and life. Copyright © 2015 by Ann E. Motl. 
 1. Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—for Using Scanners, 
ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 2, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners. 
 2. In 2012, the number of patent infringement filings was the highest 
ever recorded. See PricewaterhouseCoopers’s Patent Litigation Study Reveals 
2012 Was a Colossal Year with Patents Granted and Litigations Filed Signifi-
cantly Increasing, PWC (June 18, 2013), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press 
-releases/2013/pwcs-patent-litigation-study.jhtml [hereinafter Pricewaterhouse 
Cooper’s Patent Litigation]. 
 3. See Jeffrey C. Morgan, Do Patent Trolls Have a Future?, FED. LAW., 
Oct./Nov. 2013, at 46, 48. 
 4. High-stakes patent suits cost on average $5.5 million. Irfan A. Lateef 
& Marko R. Zoretic, The U.S. Patent Litigation Process, KNOBBE MARTENS 
(Dec. 2010), http://knobbe.com/pdf/2010-December-The-US-Patent-Litigation 
-Process.pdf. In 2012, plaintiffs won more than $1 billion in damages in three 
cases. PricewaterhouseCoopers’s Patent Litigation, supra note 2. Before 2012, 
plaintiffs had won more than $1 billion in damages in only three cases total. 
Id. 
 5. Patents are legal documents; similar to regular contracts, a party 
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note of such problems with traditional federal patent litigation, 
Congress passed the America Invents Act in 2011.
6
 The Ameri-
ca Invents Act created inter partes review (IPR), an alternative 
to federal litigation in which a party seeks to invalidate a pa-
tent in a streamlined trial-like proceeding before the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO).
7
 
IPR became available in September 2012.
8
 Since then, IPR 
has become so popular that it could essentially change patent 
litigation in the United States by creating separate forums for 
challenging the validity of a patent rather than its infringe-
ment.
9
 Such separate forums would parallel the structural 
methodology of other countries.
10
 Before the creation of IPR, pa-
tent litigation typically occurred in federal court, where a 
plaintiff accuses a defendant of infringing at least one of the 
claims of its patent.
11
 In response, a defendant may argue both 
that it did not infringe the specific claims of the patent
12
 and 
 
cannot base liability on invalid patents. See Patent Litigation, EDWARDS 
WILDMAN (2012), http://www.edwardswildman.com/files/uploads/Documents% 
5CFolios/US-PatentTradeSecretLit.pdf. Defendants thus try to argue that pa-
tents are invalid and unenforceable to avoid infringement liability. See id. De-
fendants can prove invalidity by showing the patent did not meet the neces-
sary statutory requirements at the time the patent was issued. See id. Such 
requirements, including novelty and nonobviousness, are described infra note 
14. Courts find a surprising number of patents to be invalid, relieving the de-
fendant of any infringement liability. See infra note 45. 
 6. Michael D. Stein, Overview of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
STEIN IP (June 2013), http://www.smiplaw.com/presentations/Overview-of-the 
-Leahy-Smith-America-Invents-Act.pptx. 
 7. See Patrick Doody, Post-Grant Proceedings: The Year Behind and the 
Year Ahead, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
475387/post-grant-proceedings-the-year-behind-and-the-year-ahead. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, VENABLE (Apr. 23, 
2014) http://www.venable.com/patent-trial-and-appeal-board-statistics-04-23 
-2014 (noting the popularity of IPR petitions). 
 10. E.g., Patent Invalidity Proceedings, BARDEHLE (Apr. 2014), http://www 
.bardehle.com/fileadmin/contentdocuments/broschures/Patent_invalidity_proce
edings.pdf (discussing Germany’s bifurcated patent litigation system). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (stating that federal courts have jurisdiction 
over patent-based actions). Patent claims are “the portion of the patent docu-
ment that defines the scope of the patentee’s rights.” Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). For example, a patent may have a 
claim for “[a] chair consisting of a back, a seat, and three legs.” Jon 
Schuchardt, Basic Patent Law: III. How To Read a Patent, DILWORTH IP (Mar. 
1, 2013), http://www.dilworthip.com/basic-patent-law-iii-how-to-read-a-patent. 
If someone other than the patent owner makes a chair with a back, a seat, and 
three legs, he or she has infringed the patent. See id. If the new chair has a 
back, a seat, and four legs, however, the individual has not infringed the pa-
tent. Id. 
 12. See supra note 11 for an example of noninfringement. 
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that the patent is actually invalid and thus cannot be infringed 
because the PTO should not have issued it due to a failure to 
meet the requirements for receiving a patent.
13
 For the PTO to 
issue a patent, it must be novel and nonobvious.
14
 These are 
nuanced legal doctrines, but they essentially limit patents to 
innovative inventions.
15
 The PTO determines if an invention is 
novel and nonobvious, and thus entitled to a patent, by examin-
ing prior art.
16
 Prior art is a legal term for references that dis-
close elements of the invention.
17
 During both traditional pa-
tent litigation and IPR, the party accused of infringement 
typically searches for prior art that the PTO may not have 
found, and the party then uses this prior art to argue patent 
invalidity.
18
 While Congress created IPR to shift some invalidi-
ty analysis away from federal courts, the United States does 
not have completely separate invalidity and infringement fo-
rums like other countries.
19
 IPR only addresses specific aspects 
of invalidity, and after IPR concludes, either a plaintiff or de-
fendant may continue litigation in federal court.
20
 
 
 13. See supra note 5. For an example of a case where the defendant ar-
gued both that it did not infringe the claims of the patent (its product was dif-
ferent than the patented invention) and that the patent was invalid (the PTO 
should not have issued it and it was unenforceable), see SCA Hygiene Products 
Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 767 F.3d 1339, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 2013-1564, 2014 WL 
7460970 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2014). 
 14. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012). Continuing with the chair example from 
note 11, a basic chair today would clearly not be novel because all of its ele-
ments are publicly known. A publication or patent showing a device with a 
back, a seat, and three legs would prevent someone from receiving a patent on 
the chair. If an invention is not described exactly in these publications, it still 
may be unpatentable because it could be considered obvious. For example, as-
suming a cup holder in its exact form did not exist, the PTO could say that 
such an invention is obvious. The PTO would note that a chair and cup holder 
existed separately, and it would have been obvious to combine them. The PTO 
tries to reward inventions that promote progress, and inventions that are not 
novel or are obvious do not accomplish this goal. See infra note 15. 
 15. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting an intellectual 
property system for promoting science and the arts). 
 16. See Patent FAQs, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/ 
help/patent-help (last modified Dec. 13, 2014). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying 
note 69. 
 19. See Patent Invalidity Proceedings, supra note 10, at 4 (“According to 
Germany’s bifurcated patent litigation system, the infringement of a patent is 
dealt with by specialized District Courts, whereas the validity of a patent is 
reviewed in separate proceedings by a single federal court, the Federal Patent 
Court . . . .”). 
 20. See Jennifer C. Bailey, Lessons Learned from the First Year of Inter 
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To prevent complete duplication of IPR, however, Congress 
drafted an estoppel provision. Per 35 U.S.C. § 315(e), after IPR, 
an IPR petitioner is estopped in a future forum from raising 
“any ground that [was] . . . raised or reasonably could have 
[been] raised” during the IPR proceeding.
21
 Unfortunately, this 
estoppel provision is ambiguous.
22
  
This Note addresses a question federal courts will likely 
have to consider: What is the appropriate estoppel burden on 
IPR petitioners that still effectuates Congress’s intent for IPR 
to be an efficient alternative to traditional federal litigation for 
nullifying invalid patents? Part I introduces IPR. Part II ex-
plains the two possible interpretations of IPR estoppel and dis-
cusses their tradeoffs. Part III argues it is fairest for judges to 
interpret IPR estoppel broadly, precluding nearly all evidence 
the petitioner could have used in IPR. Still, the broadest inter-
pretation is disproportionately burdensome on petitioners, so 
this Note also provides recommendations for better integrating 
IPR into a fair and effective patent litigation system. 
I.  INTER PARTES REVIEW: THE NEW PREMIER 
PROCEEDING FOR INVALIDATING A PATENT   
Since becoming available in September 2012, IPR has been 
more popular than expected.
23
 By its definition, IPR is attrac-
tive to defendants in patent litigation and other parties seeking 
to invalidate low-quality and potentially threatening patents.
24
 
 
Partes Reviews, LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2013, at 12, 15, available at http://www 
.americanbar.org/publications/landslide/2013-14/november-december/lessons_ 
learned_the_first_year_inter_partes_reviews.html. 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
 22. Thomas King & Jeffrey A. Wolfson, PTAB Rearranging the Face of Pa-
tent Litigation, LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2013, at 18, 19–20, available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/publications/landslide/2013-14/november-december/ 
ptab_rearranging_face_patent_litigation.html. 
 23. Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, supra note 9. 
 24. See David Cavanaugh & Chip O’Neill, A Practical Guide to Inter 
Partes Review, WILMERHALE (June 20, 2013), http://www.wilmerhale.com/ 
uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/WilmerHale_Files/Events/ 
WilmerHale-webinar-IPR1-20Jun13.pdf (noting “[m]ost IPRs have parallel lit-
igation pending”); see also Ryan Davis, 5 Tips for Winning USPTO Review 
Under AIA, LAW360 (Sept. 13, 2013, 7:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/472560/5-tips-for-winning-uspto-review-under-aia (recommending that 
IPR petitioners who have been sued for infringement “focus only on the claims 
of the patent that are at issue in litigation”); H. Keeto Sabharwal et al., Ad-
vantages of Inter Partes Review in Hatch-Waxman Cases, LAW360 (Nov. 15, 
2012, 1:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/392832/advantages-of-inter-
partes-review-in-hatch-waxman-cases (describing IPR as “an attractive stra-
tegic complement or alternative to abbreviated new drug application litiga-
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IPR is a proceeding for a party to “request to cancel as 
unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent . . . under section 102 
or 103 and only on the basis of prior art
25
 consisting of patents 
or printed publications.”
26
 Practically, then, if IPR judges de-
termine claims of a patent or the entire patent to be invalid, 
the patent owner can no longer sue for infringement of those 
claims.
27
 IPR effectively allows a defendant to switch from a de-
fensive position to an offensive one. 
This Part gives an overview of the IPR process and ex-
plains why it will be an important component of patent litiga-
tion. Section A discusses the differences between IPR and its 
unpopular predecessor, inter partes reexamination (IPRex), and 
accompanying legislative history. Section B discusses the me-
chanics of IPR, including a judicially created and potentially 
troubling redundancy rule. Finally, Section C concludes the 
overview of IPR by discussing the estoppel standards of both 
proceedings. 
A.  INTER PARTES REVIEW COMPARED TO INTER PARTES 
REEXAMINATION 
 As noted, IPR has been incredibly popular to date, while its 
predecessor, IPRex was not nearly as successful due to its 
many flaws.
28
 Congress sought to rectify these deficiencies 
when creating IPR.
29
 IPR incorporates more adversarial aspects 
like oral argument and is the most trial-like proceeding that 
has ever existed for challenging patents before an administra-
tive agency.
30
 IPR occurs before the newly created Patent Trial 
 
tion”). 
 25. See supra text accompanying notes 16–17. Prior art references can be 
patents, other printed publications, physical products, electronic sources, or 
any other type of reference which can convey the elements of the purported 
invention. See generally Gene Quinn, What Is Prior Art?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 
2, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/02/what-is-prior-art (discussing 
the sources and characteristics of prior art). 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Sections 102 and 103 require a patent be novel and 
nonobvious in order to be valid. Id. §§ 102, 103. Note that, unlike in federal 
litigation, Congress limited the types of prior art for invalidating patents in 
IPR to patents and printed publications. Id. 
 27. See id. § 311(b). 
 28. See Sabharwal et al., supra note 24. 
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46–48 (2011). A typical patent case, 
consisting of validity and infringement issues, can take multiple years, but 
IPRex could still last longer. See infra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
 30. See Andrei Iancu et al., Inter Partes Review Is the New Normal: What 
Has Been Lost? What Has Been Gained?, 40 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASS’N 
Q.J. 539, 541–42, 559 (2012). 
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and Appeal Board (PTAB).
31
 The PTAB is an administrative 
court, comprised of judges familiar with scientific and patent 
issues.
32
 In contrast, three patent examiners completed each 
IPRex in a format similar to applying for a patent.
33
 More im-
portant than procedural changes, however, Congress limited 
IPR’s timeframe to twelve months because IPRex could take 
longer than a patent case in federal court.
34
 In fact, IPRex took 
three years on average.
35
 Congress intended IPR to be a “quick 
and cost effective alternative[] to litigation” in the civil courts.
36
 
Next, it is less likely for the PTO to authorize IPR than 
IPRex due to the new “heightened institution standard.” Under 
the old standard, the PTO would authorize IPRex for 
any “substantial new question of patentability.”
37
 Under the 
IPR standard, a petitioner must show there is a “reasonable 
likelihood” it will succeed with respect to at least one chal-
lenged claim.
38
 Legislators intended this new standard to be 
more difficult to meet, and one PTO representative explicitly 
stated that the new standard “allows for the exercise of discre-
 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (establishing the PTAB). 
 32. Id. (requiring administrative patent judges to have “competent legal 
knowledge and scientific ability”). 
 33. In IPRex, a patent owner worked with examiners to try to persuade 
them that the patent was still valid over new prior art. See Eric J. Rogers, Ten 
Years of Inter Partes Patent Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical View, 29 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 305, 312 (2013). The patent own-
er and examiners communicated back and forth to amend claims so as to pre-
vent invalidation. See id. at 315. Senator Jon Kyl explained the change from 
IPRex to IPR as a shift from an examinational proceeding to an adjudicative 
proceeding. 157 CONG. REC. S1375–76 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 34. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America In-
vents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 622 (2012) (providing Senator 
Kyl’s comments on the undesirable length of IPRex and the viability of IPR’s 
expedited, adjudicative model); Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Puts Patent Re-Exams 
at Front of Attys’ Playbooks, LAW360 (July 8, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://www 
.law360.com/articles/455531/fed-circ-puts-patent-re-exams-at-front-of-attys 
-playbooks (discussing the use of patent reexamination to upset the final 
judgment of a lower court). 
 35. Bruce Y.C. Wu & Stephen B. Maebius, Examining AIA’s High-Speed 
Inter Partes Review System, LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2011, 12:17 PM), http://www 
.law360.com/articles/284072/examining-aia-s-high-speed-inter-partes-review 
-system. 
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011).  
 37. Arpita Bhattacharyya et al., Inter Partes Review: Making Heads or 
Tails of the ‘Reasonable Likelihood of Success’ Standard, FINNEGAN (Oct. 25, 
2013), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news= 
258c4ae3-fb7f-4855-9c85-7a487589d9b1. 
 38. Id. 
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tion but encompasses a 50/50 chance . . . of prevailing.”
39
 Under 
the old standard, the PTO instituted approximately 95% of pe-
titions.
40
 Yet, even under the new standard, the PTO has insti-
tuted approximately 80% of petitions as of July 10, 2014.
41
 Still, 
the ultimate impact of the heightened institution standard re-
mains to be seen. 
B. THE MECHANICS OF INTER PARTES REVIEW 
When a petitioner decides to file for IPR, it submits a peti-
tion to the PTO.
42
 The PTO has promulgated many rules for 
submitting a petition.
43
 Petitions for IPR must identify each 
challenged claim and show how prior art including patents and 
printed publications invalidate the claims under 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 102 or 103 which require valid patents to be novel and non-
obvious.
44
 Challenges based on obviousness and novelty are im-
portant to patent owners because they are the top two reasons 
why claims are invalidated in litigation.
45
  
Petitioners must describe these challenges within the peti-
tion’s sixty-page limit.
46
 The petition is incredibly important be-
cause the petitioner cannot advance different arguments later 
in the proceeding.
47
 After the petitioner submits its petition for 
IPR, the patent owner has three months to respond and argue 
that the PTO should not grant an IPR.
48
 The PTO must then 
decide whether to institute an IPR within three months after 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Dennis Crouch, Inter Partes Reexamination: Standard for Initiating 
Reexamination No Longer Requires “New” Issues, PATENTLYO (Apr. 7, 2012), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/04/inter-partes-reexamination 
-standard-for-initiating-reexamination-no-longer-requires-new-issues.html. 
 41. Kyle Turley, Lessons from Inter Partes Review Denials, LAW360 (Aug. 
7, 2014, 10:24 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/560759/lessons-from-inter 
-partes-review-denials. 
 42. Id. (noting that only third parties, not patent owners themselves, may 
petition for IPR). 
 43. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.101–06 (2014). 
 44. Id. § 42.104. 
 45. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Va-
lidity of Litigated Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 185, 209 tbl.2 
(1998) (noting that in federal cases where anticipation (no novelty) was an af-
firmative defense, courts invalidated 40.7% of patents, and where obviousness 
was an affirmative defense, courts invalidated 36.3% of patents). 
 46. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(i); Iancu et al., supra note 30, at 567 tbl.1. 
 47. See Ryan Davis, 4 Mistakes That Can Doom AIA Petitions, LAW360 
(Aug. 25, 2014, 5:49 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/570192/4-mistakes 
-that-can-doom-aia-petitions. 
 48. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (“The patent owner may file a preliminary response 
to the petition.” (emphasis added)). 
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the patent owner responds or by the last day the patent owner 
may respond.
49
 The PTO will only grant IPR on claims that it 
believes the challenger has a “reasonable likelihood” of invali-
dating.
50
 Once the PTO makes its decision, the PTAB has 
twelve months to complete the IPR.
51
  
When the PTAB begins IPR, the patent owner has three 
months to conduct discovery, including deposing any experts 
the petitioner used in preparing its petition.
52
 The patent owner 
then files its first substantive motion, arguing its claims are 
valid.
53
 Next, the petitioner takes discovery and files counterar-
guments.
54
 Discovery and arguments continue to alternate until 
the oral hearing.
55
  
IPR has been available for two years, and so far the PTO 
and PTAB have met their time constraints.
56
 The PTAB has 
met its constraints by limiting discovery
57
 and granting peti-
tioners’ arguments for fewer than half of proposed claims.
58
 
While the PTAB will reject arguments on claims it believes do 
not meet the heightened institution standard, the PTAB has al-
so begun rejecting arguments on “cumulative/redundancy” 
grounds.
59
 In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Cas-
ualty Insurance Co., the petitioner Liberty Mutual raised 422 
grounds for rejection of the twenty claims of the patent based 
on ten prior art references.
60
 The PTAB rejected many of these 
 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2012). 
 50. Id. § 314(a). 
 51. Id. § 316(a)(11) (giving the Director of the PTO an additional six 
months for good cause). 
 52. Iancu et al., supra note 30, at 553. 
 53. Id. at 556. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 556–58. 
 56. See Doody, supra note 7 (noting the PTO has a maximum of six 
months to determine whether to initiate trial, and it has made this decision in 
5.1 months on average). On November 13, 2013, the PTAB released its first 
IPR final decision on the merits, well ahead of the one-year deadline, which 
would have been January 9, 2014. Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. 
LLC, No. IPR-2012-00001, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1852, 1854 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 
2013). 
 57. See generally Vic Souto, How PTAB Applies ‘Interests of Justice’ Dis-
covery Standard, LAW360 (Sept. 9, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.law360 
.com/articles/468183/how-ptab-applies-interests-of-justice-discovery-standard 
(discussing the rules governing IPR proceedings that limit discovery). 
 58. See Doody, supra note 7 (finding that the PTO only grants trial for 
about 32.8% of claims). 
 59. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM-
2012-00003, 2012 WL 9494791, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012). 
 60. Id. at *1. 
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grounds for being redundant.
61
 The PTAB identified two exam-
ples of redundancy: (1) where multiple prior art references 
show the same rejection; and (2) where a petitioner uses more 
prior art references than necessary in combination to show ob-
viousness.
62
 The PTAB ordered Liberty Mutual to reduce its ar-
guments for rejection, even though these arguments may have 
met the standard necessary to institute trial.
63
 In other cases, 
however, the PTAB chose grounds for rejection itself when it 
determined arguments were redundant.
64
 The PTAB argued 
that 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b), which requires “‘the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolution of every proceeding,’” gives it the au-
thority to deny arguments on redundancy grounds.
65
 
At the end of IPR, the PTAB will issue a claim construc-
tion.
66
 A claim construction defines the scope and meaning of a 
claim.
67
 For example, in one IPR decision, the PTAB construed 
the claim language “engine off” to mean “engine not running.”
68
 
The petitioner argued for a slightly different definition because 
it believed it had prior art to show these claims were anticipat-
ed (not novel) and thus invalid under its proposed definition.
69
 
As with all types of patent litigation, claim construction is an 
important part of the process for determining if prior art inval-
idates a patent. 
C. ESTOPPEL PROVISIONS OF INTER PARTES REVIEW AND INTER 
PARTES REEXAMINATION 
Once the PTAB releases its claim construction, it then de-
termines whether the patent’s claims are invalid.
70
 If the PTAB 
determines none or only some of the claims are invalid, litiga-
 
 61. Id. at *2. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at *4, 6–9. 
 64. See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., No. IPR2013-00034, 2013 WL 
5970155, at *7 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2013). 
 65. Liberty Mut., 2012 WL 9494791, at *1 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) 
(2014)). 
 66. See Scott A. McKeown, Early PTAB Claim Construction—The Faster, 
Cheaper Markman Order, PATENTS POST-GRANT (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www 
.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2013/10/early-ptab-claim-construction-to-drive 
-litigation-settlements. 
 67. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1247–48 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 68. Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00027, 109 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1443, 1447 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2014). 
 69. See id. at 1447–49. 
 70. See id. at 1448. 
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tion may continue in another forum.
71
 Petitioners thus have two 
opportunities for a court to declare a patent invalid.
72
 However, 
this opportunity is tempered by IPR’s estoppel provision. This 
new provision, 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), states: 
The petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in a final 
written decision . . . may not assert either in a civil action . . . or in a 
proceeding before the International Trade Commission . . . that the 
claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably 
could have raised during that inter partes review.
73
 
In contrast, the previous estoppel provision for IPRex was: 
A third-party requester whose request for an inter partes reexamina-
tion results in an order . . . is estopped from asserting at a later time, 
in any civil action . . . any ground which the third-party requester 
raised or could have raised . . . . This subsection does not prevent the 
assertion of invalidity based on newly discovered prior art unavaila-
ble to the third-party requester and the Patent and Trademark Office 
at the time of the inter partes reexamination proceedings.
74
  
A comparison of the two statutes shows a simultaneous 
strengthening and weakening of IPR’s estoppel provisions. Spe-
cifically, IPR estoppel applies not only to federal court proceed-
ings, but also proceedings before the International Trade 
Commission.
75
 Furthermore, the estoppel provision of IPRex 
had an escape clause allowing parties to avoid estoppel upon 
the discovery of newly found prior art, while the IPR statute 
contains no such clause.
76
 Still, Congress softened the effects of 
estoppel after IPR because the new statute replaces “could have 
raised” with “reasonably could have raised.”
77
 
Indeed, Congress recognized the need to draft the estoppel 
provision to prevent parties from asserting duplicative and 
wasteful arguments in future forums, yet also the need to en-
courage parties to use IPR while maintaining rights for future 
litigation.
78
 Early in the lengthy history of the America Invents 
Act, the IPR estoppel only applied to arguments actually 
 
 71. See supra Introduction. 
 72. See Bailey, supra note 20. 
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2002) (emphasis added) (current version at 35 
U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012)). 
 75. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012). 
 76. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2002) 
(current version at 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012)). 
 77. See 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Jon Kyl); see also infra text accompanying notes 83–84. 
 78. Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 32 (2004) (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Execu-
tive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association). 
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raised.
79
 While businesses and professional patent law associa-
tions supported this provision,
80
 patent owners and some con-
gressmen instead argued for stronger estoppel provisions.
81
 
Congress compromised and noted the importance of softening 
the “could have raised” provision.
82
 Senator Kyl noted courts 
could interpret the “could have raised” provision as estopping 
petitioners “from raising any issue that it would have been 
physically possible to raise . . . even if only a scorched-earth 
search around the world would have uncovered the prior art in 
question.”
83
 He then defined the “reasonably could have raised” 
provision as preventing “only . . . that prior art which a skilled 
searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could have 
been expected to discover.”
84
  
To date, practitioners have little guidance for determining 
what Senator Kyl considers prior art a skilled searcher should 
reasonably discover.
85
 While the PTAB has issued over 100 IPR 
written decisions,
86
 no federal litigation subsequent to IPR has 
addressed the question of estoppel.
87
 Further, “the Federal Cir-
 
 79. See Matal, supra note 34, at 618. 
 80. Review of Recent Judicial Decisions on Patent Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 58 (2011) (statement of Andrew J. Pincus, May-
er Brown LLP) (calling broad estoppel “treacherous”). 
 81. See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 210 (2007) (statement of 
Bruce G. Bernstein, Chief Intellectual Property and Licensing Officer, 
InterDigital Communications Corp.); 157 CONG. REC. S1326 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 
2011) (statement of Sen. Jefferson Sessions) (noting the “reasonably could 
have raised” estoppel provisions “were long sought by inventors and patent 
owners”). 
 82. America Invents Act: Hearing on H.R. 1249 Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 112th Cong. 52 (2011) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Member, 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet) (“[T]here is 
significant disincentive to bring an action because in the litigation, anything 
that could have been raised can’t be used.”). 
 83. 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon 
Kyl). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See King & Wolfson, supra note 22. 
 86. Dorothy Whelan & Gwilym Attwell, Challenging and Defending 
BioPharma Patents at the PTAB—What Practitioners Need To Know, FISH & 
RICHARDSON 9 (Aug. 13, 2014), http://fishpostgrant.com/wp-content/uploads/8 
-13-14-PG-Webinar-FINAL.pdf. 
 87. But see Star Envirotech, Inc. v. Redline Detection, LLC, Case No. 8:12-
cv-01861, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015), available at http:// 
interpartesreviewblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Star-EnviroTech -Inc-
v-Redline-Detection-LLC-Case-No-8-12-cv-01861-slip-op-C-D-Cal-Jan-29 
-2015.pdf. In a recent order, the district court addressed a simpler estoppel 
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cuit has . . . never addressed the scope of estoppel after an inter 
partes reexamination has . . . concluded.”
88
 Thus, there is no 
guidance from the Federal Circuit, the patent appeals court, 
regarding the preclusive effect of the estoppel provision. 
However, there are two reasons federal courts will soon 
need to address estoppel issues. First, IPR estoppel attaches 
immediately upon the PTAB’s written decision, whereas IPRex 
estoppel did not attach until all appeals were exhausted.
89
 Be-
cause appeals from IPRex were typically not exhausted until 
federal litigation ended, federal courts rarely had the oppor-
tunity to address estoppel.
90
 Since IPR is shorter and estoppel 
attaches immediately, federal courts will likely soon find them-
selves facing estoppel questions.
91
 Secondly, petitioners can ad-
vance far fewer arguments in IPR due to the sixty-page limit, 
the heightened institution standard, and the PTAB’s denial on 
redundant grounds.
92
 In cases where the PTAB invalidates 
none or only some of the claims, the petitioner will likely have 
many arguments it wishes to bring in federal courts, and what 
evidence and arguments are estopped will be a contentious is-
sue.
93
 
II.  THE OPEN QUESTION OF INTER PARTES REVIEW 
ESTOPPEL   
When courts eventually interpret the IPR estoppel provi-
sion, they will need to effectuate the legislative intent by con-
sidering Congress’s ultimate goal of making IPR a speedy and 
inexpensive alternative to typical federal patent litigation.
94
 
 
question than this Note considers. There, litigation continued in district court 
after the PTAB found that the petitioner Redline failed to show the two chal-
lenged claims were invalid. Id. at 2. Defendant Redline attempted to introduce 
a physical machine to prove invalidity, but plaintiff Star Envirotech argued 
that Redline should be estopped from using this model. Id. at 3–4. Star 
Envirotech conceded that IPR rules limit prior art to patents and printed pub-
lications, but Star Envirotech nonetheless argued that Redline had the own-
er’s manual of the prior art machine in its possession at the time of IPR and 
thus could have submitted that. Id. The court disagreed, also noting that the 
physical machine disclosed more features than the owner’s manual disclosed, 
and Redline was thus not estopped from using the physical machine in its in-
validity arguments. Id. at 4. The primary focus of this Note is to consider the 
more difficult estoppel issues, regarding only patents and printed publications. 
 88. King & Wolfson, supra note 22, at 2–3. 
 89. See Bailey, supra note 20, at 4. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See King & Wolfson, supra note 22, at 3. 
 92. See Bailey, supra note 20, at 2–4. 
 93. Id. at 4–5; King & Wolfson, supra note 22, at 2–3. 
 94. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011). 
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The proper interpretation of IPR estoppel thus rests on balanc-
ing the burdens between the petitioner and patent owner to en-
sure the use of IPR. A proper interpretation will continue to en-
courage petitioners to use IPR without fear of undue 
repercussions from an imperfect proceeding, while simultane-
ously protecting patent owners’ legitimate rights. 
Before examining possible interpretations of the IPR es-
toppel statute, it is necessary to consider the benefits and bur-
dens for parties in a typical IPR. Section A discusses these ben-
efits and burdens. Section B introduces the two possible 
interpretations for the IPR estoppel provision: a broad and 
strict interpretation, and a narrower and more forgiving inter-
pretation. Section B further examines the tradeoffs of both in-
terpretations. 
A. TYPICAL BENEFITS AND BURDENS FOR PARTIES IN INTER 
PARTES REVIEW  
Subsection 1 describes the benefits and burdens IPR peti-
tioners must consider before determining whether IPR is the 
appropriate forum for potential patent invalidation. Subsection 
2 describes the risks and potential benefits for patent owners in 
IPR. The parties’ respective benefits and burdens are important 
to take into account when determining the proper IPR estoppel 
interpretation. 
1. Benefits and Burdens for the IPR Petitioner 
The petitioner has the most to gain from IPR because it 
could be successful in convincing the PTAB to invalidate some 
claims or even the entire patent.
95
 If the PTAB invalidates all of 
the patent owner’s claims, the petitioner will be completely free 
from infringement liability.
96
 There are additional persuasive 
reasons for petitioners to invoke IPR. Most notably, the IPR 
process is much shorter than a typical federal trial.
97
 This 
shortened timeframe saves petitioners attorney fees and allows 
petitioners to return to normal business more quickly.
98
  
District courts are also more likely to grant a stay of litiga-
 
 95. See supra Introduction. 
 96. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
 97. Daniel G. Barry, Invalidating Patents Through Inter Partes Review, 
SNELL & WILMER (July 14, 2013), http://www.swlaw.com/assets/pdf/news/ 
2013/07/08/InvalidatingPatentsThroughInterPartesReview_Barry.pdf. 
 98. Id. 
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tion
99
 pending IPR than they were for IPRex.
100
 Because the 
statute requires IPR to last no longer than twelve months, dis-
trict courts are more comfortable granting a stay, whereas 
IPRex could last for years and staying federal litigation could 
cause a patent owner to indefinitely postpone its case.
101
 In-
deed, as of October 2014, district courts stayed corresponding 
litigation pending IPR litigation in approximately seventy per-
cent of cases, and it is likely this percentage will rise.
102
 When a 
district court stays litigation, this saves the petitioner money 
because it no longer has to fund two simultaneous legal battles, 
and a successful IPR may cancel subsequent infringement liti-
gation.
103
 Patent practitioners thus predict the overall cost of 
IPR will be $300,000 to $800,000, making IPR cost a tenth of a 
typical patent litigation suit.
104
  
While attorneys were slow to embrace IPRex, these factors 
have made IPR popular, with the number of IPRs filed in the 
first year of its availability exceeding the PTO’s expectations by 
five percent.
105
 Further, between the beginning of IPR availabil-
ity in September 2012 and August 7, 2014, petitioners filed 
more than 1500 petitions.
106
 
Despite these advantages, petitioners face new disad-
vantages. Whereas petitioners could submit petitions for IPRex 
comprising hundreds of pages, petitions for IPR may only be 
 
 99. A stay of litigation means that the district court places the case on 
hold until IPR is complete. See Meaghan H. Kent et al., Stays of Litigation 
Pending IPR Are Likely To Increase, LAW360 (June 26, 2014, 10:09 AM ET), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/540456/stays-of-litigation-pending-ipr-are 
-likely-to-increase. 
 100. Bryan Wheelock & Matthew Cutler, A Look at 1st Year Stats on Inter 
Partes Review, LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/475994/a-look-at-1st-year-stats-on-inter-partes-review. 
 101. See, e.g., Interface, Inc. v. Tandus Flooring, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-46-WSD, 
2013 WL 5945177, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2013); Star Envirotech, Inc. v. Red-
line Detection, LLC, No. SACV 12-01861 JGB, 2013 WL 1716068, at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 3, 2013); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 
No. SACV 12-21-JST (JPRX), 2012 WL 7170593, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 
2012). 
 102. Dorothy Whelan et al., Stays, Finality, and Estoppel—Timing a Post-
Grant Attack To Maximize Litigation Benefit, FISH & RICHARDSON, 10 (Nov. 
12, 2014), http://fishpostgrant.com/wp-content/uploads/11.12.14-PG-Webinar 
.pdf; see also Andrew J. Lagatta & George C. Lewis, How Inter Partes Review 
Became a Valuable Tool So Quickly, LAW360 (Aug. 16, 2013, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/463372/how-inter-partes-review-became-a 
-valuable-tool-so-quickly (noting comparable older statistics). 
 103. Lagatta & Lewis, supra note 102. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Doody, supra note 7. 
 106. See id.; see also Whelan & Attwell, supra note 86, at 5. 
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sixty pages, double-spaced, and size fourteen font.
107
 This page 
limit compounds the redundancy problem described above be-
cause petitioners might lack space to fully explain how each 
prior art is not redundant. Petitioners must also spend part of 
this valuable space offering a claim construction, something 
they were not required to do in IPRex.
108
 
2. Benefits and Burdens for the IPR Patent Owner 
While IPR places a patent owner’s intellectual property 
rights in danger, there are some factors in IPR that favor pa-
tent owners. For example, unlike petitioners, patent owners do 
not have to offer a claim construction.
109
 This is a major benefit 
for patent owners because it is theoretically possible for them 
to complete an entire IPR without offering a proposed claim 
construction and thus avoid unanticipated future claim narrow-
ing.
110
 IPR also offers other procedural benefits for patent own-
ers. After the petitioner files for IPR, the patent owner can ar-
gue both that IPR is inappropriate on the merits of the 
challenged claims and that the petitioner’s arguments are re-
dundant. Theoretically then, the patent owner could reduce ten 
of the petitioner’s arguments to a single argument. After the 
PTO grants review, IPR discovery rules arguably favor patent 
owners.
111
 
Despite these advantages, the purpose of IPR is intrinsical-
ly adverse to the best interests of the patent owner.
112
 Congress 
created IPR to make it easier for petitioners to invalidate pa-
tents, and to date, Congress’s goal is being realized. As of 
March 2014, “the overwhelming majority of cases have seen all 
of the reviewed claims canceled.”
113
 Further, between the issu-
ance of the first IPR final decision in November 2013 and Feb-
ruary 19, 2014, the PTAB did not uphold a single claim.
114
 The-
 
 107. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(a), 42.24(a)(i) (2014).  
 108. See id. § 42.104(b)(3); see also Iancu et al., supra note 30, at 579. 
 109. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.120; see also Iancu et al., supra note 30, at 579.  
 110. Iancu et al., supra note 30, at 580; Cavanaugh & O’Neill, supra note 
24 (noting an “[a]ccused infringer may be able to elicit disclaimers from the 
patentee that support a later non-infringement position”). 
 111. See Iancu et al., supra note 30, at 574 (explaining that discovery fa-
vors patent owners because they usually have the opportunity to take discov-
ery first). 
 112. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (describing IPR as a process to cancel 
unpatentable claims). 
 113. Andrew Williams, Inter Partes ReviewA Look Back, PATENT DOCS 
(Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.patentdocs.org/2014/03/inter-partes-review-a-look 
-back.html. 
 114. Id. 
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se statistics led the former chief judge of the Federal Circuit to 
call the PTAB “death squads.”
115
 Some practitioners believe 
these early statistics are misleading, however. Specifically, 
some argue that the PTAB overwhelmingly invalidated patents 
in early cases because parties only petitioned clearly invalid 
patents when IPR was introduced.
116
 In support of that argu-
ment, the PTAB chief judge noted the number of claims surviv-
ing IPR is rising.
117
 
Whether or not the PTAB is a “death squad,” many aspects 
of IPR are problematic for patent owners. Specifically, the 
PTAB is more likely to invalidate claims than federal courts 
based on the PTAB’s claim construction standard, the burden of 
proof needed for invalidity, and the specialized nature of the 
court.
118
 First, the PTAB reads claims more broadly than dis-
trict courts do, making them more susceptible to invalidation 
under nonobviousness or novelty requirements.
119
 Next, unlike 
federal courts, the PTAB does not afford patents a presumption 
of validity.
120
 Thus, petitioners need only show invalidity by a 
preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and con-
vincing evidence.
121
  
Further, the PTAB is more likely to invalidate claims than 
a district court would due to its specialized nature.
122
 At least 
one patent practitioner argues the PTAB is more likely to find 
claims invalid because its judges have technical backgrounds 
and patent experience which gives them a greater ability to 
combine multiple prior art references and find claims to be ob-
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Cf. Ryan Davis, USPTO Upheld Some Patent Claims in 41% of AIA 
Reviews, LAW360 (May 22, 2014, 5:42 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/540857/uspto-upheld-some-patent-claims-in-41-of-aia-reviews. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Gene Quinn, The Past, Present and Future of Post Grant Administra-
tive Trials, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog 
.com/2014/09/18/the-past-present-and-future-of-post-grant-administrative 
-trials/id=51298. 
 119. Leslie A. McDonell & Robert A. Pollock, Inter Partes Review: Tips for 
the Patent Holder, FINNEGAN (May 24, 2013), http://www.finnegan.com/ 
resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=339129db-4df9-4439-a216-
91cca9ba55f3. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Kimberly D. Braslow, Inaugural IPR Decision Provides Insight for Pa-
tent Challengers Deciding Between IPR and District Court Litigation, AIA 
BLOG (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.aiablog.com/post-grant-proceedings/ 
inaugural-ipr-decision-provides-insight-for-patent-challengers-deciding 
-between-ipr-and-district-court-litigation/#more-1018. 
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vious.
123
 In contrast, district court judges and juries with less 
experience are less likely to combine three or four prior art ref-
erences to find a claim obvious and invalid.
124
 Because of the po-
tential for different outcomes in IPR and federal courts, many 
practitioners are interested in predicting how estoppel from 
IPR will affect federal litigation. 
B. POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF INTER PARTES REVIEW 
ESTOPPEL 
There are two likely interpretations for the IPR estoppel 
provision. First, there is a broad interpretation in which courts 
estop parties from using any and all printed publications and 
patents to challenge the validity of a patent in federal court or 
the International Trade Commission on novel and nonobvious 
grounds.
125
 Proponents of this interpretation argue a petitioner 
reasonably could have raised any printed publication or patent 
in its petition, and thus a court should apply the estoppel pro-
vision broadly.
126
 Thus, if a petitioner did not discover “a uni-
versity research paper in a library in Norway” in time for IPR, 
for example, the petitioner would never be able to use this ref-
erence because it could have been reasonably located.
127
  
A second interpretation hinges on the term “reasonably.” 
Under this narrower interpretation, courts would estop some, 
but not all, patents and printed publications to invalidate a pa-
tent on novel or nonobvious grounds.
128
 There are many types of 
evidence and arguments courts could allow in. For example, 
courts could allow petitioners to continue to raise arguments 
they included in their petitions, but were “not part of the re-
view authorized by the” PTAB due to the heightened institution 
standard or redundancy findings.
129
 In these cases, since the 
PTAB prevented the petitioner from bringing its arguments in 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Cheryl Milone, Raise the Standard of Care in Prior Art Research, 
LAW360 (May 6, 2013, 12:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/436211/ 
raise-the-standard-of-care-in-prior-art-research (noting challengers may not 
“get a second chance” asserting prior art); see also Letter from IBM Corp. to 
Lead Judge Michael Tierney, Comments Regarding “Changes To Implement 
Inter Partes Review Proceedings” (Apr. 6 2012), available at http:// 
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/comment-ibm5.pdf. 
 126. See Milone, supra note 125. 
 127. Cf. id. (describing how such a paper invalidated an NPE’s patent in 
IPRex). 
 128. See Letter from IBM Corp. to Lead Judge Michael Tierney, supra note 
125, at 5. 
 129. See id.; see also Iancu et al., supra note 30, at 551 n.62.  
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trial, the petitioner could not reasonably have raised its argu-
ments, and courts would not apply the estoppel provision.  
Subsection 1 describes considerations of the first interpre-
tation, and Subsection 2 describes considerations of the second 
interpretation. 
1. Considerations of a Broad Interpretation of Estoppel 
Courts will need to consider statutory interpretation prin-
ciples when determining which IPR estoppel interpretation to 
apply. Specifically, courts must analyze the plain language of 
the IPR provision, accompanying legislative history, and policy 
considerations of each interpretation to effectuate Congress’s 
intent in making IPR a popular alternative to federal litiga-
tion.
130
 
a. Statutory Support for a Broad Interpretation of Estoppel 
Statutory interpretation could support a broad interpreta-
tion of estoppel and prohibit defendants from using any and all 
printed publications and patents to challenge the validity of a 
patent in a future forum on novel and nonobvious grounds. If a 
court construes “reasonably” broadly they will likely apply a 
broad interpretation of estoppel, as the more one expects a peti-
tioner to reasonably argue, the more that is actually estopped. 
Further, a plain meaning interpretation could support a broad 
estoppel interpretation because the IPR estoppel statute does 
not contain an escape clause preventing estoppel of these ar-
guments like the IPRex estoppel statute did.
131
  
b. Positive Policy Effects of a Broad Estoppel Interpretation 
Further, there are many positive policy effects from inter-
preting IPR estoppel broadly. A broad interpretation of IPR es-
toppel is best for patent owners and the federal court system. 
First, a broad estoppel interpretation is fairest for the patent 
owner. As discussed, patent owners are most at risk in IPR, 
and once the PTAB invalidates the patent owner’s patent, it 
does not have a second chance to get the patent reinstated.
132
 
Thus, the petitioner should not have a full second chance to in-
 
 130. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011). 
 131. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012) (containing no escape clause 
provision), with 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2002) (current version at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 315(e)(2) (2012)) (providing an exemption from estoppel for newly discovered 
prior art). 
 132. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
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validate the patent, even on evidence not fully examined during 
trial by the PTAB. A patent owner would further argue that 
IPR is simply a high risk, high reward process for the petition-
er. Indeed, petitioners voluntarily assume the risk of IPR, and 
since they could forego the risk and challenge the patent in fed-
eral court, it is appropriate to subject them to more stringent 
restrictions meant to balance burdens between parties.
133
 
Secondly, a broader estoppel interpretation is better for the 
judicial system because it reduces redundant arguments and 
promotes judicial efficiency.
134
 Emphasis on preserving judicial 
resources is especially important in the patent litigation system 
because patents may be litigated in so many forums including 
federal courts, the PTO, and the International Trade Commis-
sion.
135
 Indeed, as one magistrate judge from the Northern Dis-
trict of California stated, it is difficult “to identify even a single 
circumstance outside the patent world where such redundan-
cies are not only permitted, but invited.”
136
 A broad estoppel re-
quirement thus places patent litigation more in line with other 
types of civil litigation.  
While petitioners may argue broad estoppel is unfair be-
cause the PTAB ultimately rejects many of the arguments they 
raise in petitions as redundant,
137
 it is reasonable to expect pe-
titioners to bring forth only their best arguments, as they 
would to a jury considering the same issues.
138
 Further, the 
PTAB is more likely to invalidate claims than federal courts be-
cause of IPR’s unique procedural aspects,
139
 so it would be inef-
ficient to expect district court judges to consider issues the 
 
 133. See Doody, supra note 7. 
 134. See generally Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining Post-Grant Review Estoppel 
in the America Invents Act: A Call for Legislative Restraint, 2012 PATENTLY-O 
PAT. L.J. 1, 14, available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2012/11/stoll 
.2012.estoppel.pdf (discussing how stronger estoppel for a different adjudica-
tive patent proceeding leads to less judicial waste). 
 135. See Doody, supra note 7. 
 136. Pi-Net Int’l, Inc. v. Focus Bus. Bank, C-12-4958-PSG, 2013 WL 
4475940, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013), adhered to in part on reconsideration, 
C-12-4958 PSG, 2013 WL 5513333 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 137. For example, the PTAB denied nearly 100 grounds as redundant in 
the Berk-Tek, LLC v. Belden, Inc. litigation. Matt Cutler, 51 for 56: Two IPR 
Trials Granted, Despite Dozens of Grounds Being Denied As Redundant, 
HARNESSING PAT. OFF. LITIG. (July 1, 2013), http://ipr-pgr.com/51-for-56-two 
-ipr-trials-granted-despite-dozens-of-grounds-being-denied-as-redundant. 
 138. Julie Blackman et al., East Texas Jurors and Patent Litigation, JURY 
EXPERT (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2010/03/east-texas 
-jurors-and-patent-litigation (emphasizing the need for simple and disjunctive 
arguments during jury trials). 
 139. See supra Part II.A. 
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PTAB denied, even when they were only denied for being re-
dundant or failing to meet the heightened institution standard. 
Lastly, a bright line rule preventing the use of any printed pub-
lications for invalidating the patent based on novel and nonob-
vious requirements is better for the judicial system because it 
leads to predictability for the parties and is an easier standard 
for judges to apply.
140
 
c. Negative Policy Effects of a Broad Estoppel Interpretation 
While there are many reasons a stricter estoppel interpre-
tation benefits patent owners and courts, there are several sit-
uations that demonstrate the disparate effect this interpreta-
tion has on petitioners.  
The most classic example of a disparate effect on petition-
ers occurs when a petitioner challenges twenty claims based on 
a large number of prior art references, and the PTAB institutes 
IPR on only one claim based on one prior art reference. Then, 
the IPR petitioner would be unable to argue the other nineteen 
claims are invalid in a future forum based on novelty and non-
obvious arguments. In that case, the petitioner may have ra-
ther had its petition completely denied so it could start over in 
another forum because when the PTAB denies IPR, estoppel 
does not attach.
141
 
Additionally, some procedural rules of IPR make a broad 
estoppel interpretation disadvantageous for petitioners. First, a 
defendant must petition for IPR within a year of receiving no-
tice of an infringement lawsuit against it.
142
 If the defendant 
does not submit a petition within a year, it can never file for 
IPR on that patent.
143
 In many cases, one year is much too short 
for the defendant to mount its defense to infringement liability 
while creating an offensive position by petitioning for IPR. As 
soon as it receives notice of the suit, the defendant must draft 
 
 140. See LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Re-
form Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology 
Cases, UCLA J.L. & TECH., no. 1, 2002, at 1, available at http://www 
.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/01_020309_kondo.pdf (noting that bright 
line rules “enhanc[e] predictability of judgment throughout the district 
courts”). 
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its motion to stay federal litigation pending IPR, because if liti-
gation is in the early stages, this weighs in favor for staying lit-
igation.
144
 Next, as the defendant prepares its petition for IPR it 
may not know which claims to challenge because it may not 
even know which claims a plaintiff is asserting. While 
Twombly and Iqbal require notice pleading,
145
 Form 18 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the facts a plaintiff 
needs to adequately plead infringement, and this form does not 
require stating the allegedly infringing claims.
146
 The defendant 
may thus be left in the dark while trying to find every possible 
invalidating patent and printed publication, analyze this prior 
art, obtain expert testimony, craft arguments, and draft its six-
ty-page petition with hopes the PTO will find its arguments 
meet the heightened institution standard and are not redun-
dant.
147
  
Another IPR procedure which detrimentally affects the pe-
titioner regarding estoppel is the claim construction process 
which differs markedly from federal litigation. In district court, 
the parties participate in a Markman hearing where a judge 
rules on the breadth of the claims.
148
 The Markman hearing oc-
curs after some, but not all, discovery and is before the jury tri-
al on infringement and invalidity.
149
 Practically, this means pa-
tent challengers have a greater opportunity to develop their 
arguments for the ultimate ruling on invalidity since the judge 
construes the claims earlier.  
In contrast, petitioners are at a disadvantage regarding 
claim construction in IPR. For example, a petitioner may chal-
lenge claim 1 with Prior Art A and B, focusing its limited space 
for arguments on Prior Art A because it believes the PTAB will 
likely construe claim 1 in a certain manner. The PTAB may de-
ny Prior Art B on redundancy grounds. Then, at the end of IPR 
the PTAB may issue a claim construction that construes claim 
1 differently than the petitioner expected. It may be that Prior 
Art B would have had a better chance of invalidating claim 1. 
 
 144. See Software Rights Archive, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., C-12-3970 RMW, 
2013 WL 5225522, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2013). 
 145. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007).  
 146. The Federal Circuit has noted that if “any conflict exists be-
tween Twombly (and its progeny) and the Forms regarding pleadings re-
quirements, the Forms control.” K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Ca-
ble, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1283–84, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 147. See supra Part I.B. 
 148. Supra Part I.B. 
 149. Supra Part I.B. 
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Now, however, the PTAB’s claim construction is persuasive to 
district courts and the petitioner cannot use Prior Art B, even 
though this reference was dismissed simply for being redun-
dant when the presumptions were different. Therefore, because 
judges construe claims at the end of the process, petitioners 
face an uphill battle in IPR.
150
  
Overall, considering the limited number of arguments peti-
tioners can make in IPR due to short page limits, denial on re-
dundant grounds, and the heightened institution standard, a 
broad estoppel requirement may be problematic considering the 
current patent litigation landscape. Specifically, the PTO re-
ceives a burdensome number of patent applications every year, 
and while it tries to make headway in this backlog, it unfortu-
nately grants patents that it should not have issued.
151
 Between 
2007 and 2011, district courts only fully upheld fourteen per-
cent of challenged patents.
152
 A broader estoppel interpretation 
will thus lead to fewer arguments a defendant can use to chal-
lenge patents in district court, and courts may invalidate fewer 
low-quality patents. And since lower quality patents lead to 
more unnecessary and potentially abusive litigation, true inno-
vators will face onerous legal costs and have less incentive to 
innovate, defeating the purpose of the intellectual property 
clause of the Constitution.
153
 
2. Considerations of a Narrower Interpretation of Estoppel 
Proponents of a narrower estoppel interpretation may 
point to the above deficiencies when advocating for a more flex-
ible interpretation of estoppel. This Subsection outlines statu-
 
 150. See supra Part I.C. (noting judges also construe claims at the end of 
litigation in the International Trade Commission which disadvantages patent 
challengers). 
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-backlog.shtml. 
 152. ROBERT SMYTH, MORGAN LEWIS, WHITE PAPER REPORT: UNITED 
STATES PATENT INVALIDITY STUDY (Sept. 2012), https://www.morganlewis 
.com/pubs/Smyth_USPatentInvalidity_Sept12.pdf. 
 153. See Julie Samuels, GAO Study Confirms the Obvious: Bad Patents 
Lead to Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.eff 
.org/deeplinks/2013/08/gao-study-confirms-obvious-bad-patents-lead-trolls. 
The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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tory support for a narrow interpretation of estoppel and pro-
vides positive and negative policy effects of a narrow interpre-
tation. Certainly, some negative effects of a broad interpreta-
tion of estoppel lend themselves to positive effects of a narrow 
interpretation of estoppel, so this Subsection seeks to introduce 
only new considerations. 
a. Statutory Support for a Narrower Interpretation of Estoppel 
Statutory interpretation could also support a narrower in-
terpretation of estoppel. A court may determine the term “rea-
sonably” to be ambiguous. When a court determines the statute 
is ambiguous, it looks to the legislative history for guidance.
154
 
As noted above, Senator Kyl supported a narrower and more 
forgiving estoppel provision.
155
 Additionally, judges could inter-
pret “reasonably” to differentiate between types of evidence. 
For example, courts could refuse to estop evidence deliberately 
hidden by the patent owner.
156
 
b. Positive Policy Effects of a Narrower Estoppel Interpretation 
Petitioners likely desire a narrower interpretation of es-
toppel. Under a narrower interpretation of estoppel, petitioners 
could raise arguments in district court they did not have the 
opportunity to fully argue before the PTAB.
157
 Indeed, petition-
ers spend time and money on these arguments, and many ar-
gue the PTAB does not have the authority to deny arguments 
on cumulative grounds when arguments meet the heightened 
institution standard.
158
 Petitioners would thus argue estoppel 
should not attach in such cases.  
c. Negative Policy Effects of a Narrower Estoppel 
Interpretation 
Opponents of a narrower estoppel interpretation note that 
allowing petitioners to advance additional arguments in subse-
quent litigation is burdensome for the court system. Specifical-
ly, any additional benefit a narrow estoppel interpretation pro-
 
 154. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 600 (2009). 
 155. See 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl). 
 156. See Letter from IBM Corp. to Lead Judge Michael Tierney, supra note 
125, at 5. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Matt Cutler, PTAB Drawing Fire for Denying Petition Grounds As 
Cumulative—Not Backing Down, HARNESSING PAT. OFF. LITIG. (Apr. 10, 
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vides for the petitioner likely does not exceed the cost to the 
court system. As noted, at the conclusion of IPR the PTAB re-
leases a claim construction based on the evidence offered and 
arguments made.
159
 This claim construction will be very per-
suasive for district courts, negating new arguments by the de-
fendant.
160
 Ultimately, a narrower estoppel interpretation may 
only make more work for already busy federal courts that do 
not have the time or resources for many complex patent cas-
es.
161
 And with the increase in abusive litigation, a narrower es-
toppel interpretation may induce patent assertion entities (pa-
tent trolls)
162
 or other harassing plaintiffs to continue to raise 
poor arguments in future forums with hopes of forcing the de-
fendant into settlement.
163
 
III.  A MODIFIED BROAD ESTOPPEL INTERPRETATION IS 
BEST WHEN COMBINED WITH PROCEDURAL CHANGES 
TO RECTIFY UNNECESSARY DISADVANTAGES FOR THE 
PETITIONER   
Per 35 U.S.C. § 315(e), some estoppel must attach to pre-
vent petitioners from advancing duplicative arguments in fo-
rums after completing IPR.
164
 Practitioners have noted the am-
biguity of the statute and some of the problems which arise 
from different interpretations. Section A thus proposes a novel 
interpretation for judges: federal judges should interpret IPR 
estoppel broadly, preventing petitioners from bringing all ar-
guments in a future forum, excluding instances where the pa-
tent owner hid prior art. Still, as previously noted, a broad in-
terpretation of estoppel unfairly burdens petitioners, and this 
may persuade potential petitioners against using IPR, defeat-
ing its purpose as a cost-effective and speedy alternative to tra-
ditional patent litigation.
165
 Thus, Section B provides remedies 
 
 159. See supra Part I.B. 
 160. Supra Part I.B.  
 161. The “Smart Phone War” trials are an example of the resource draining 
patent litigation cases that are becoming more common. See Florian Mueller, 
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Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLYO (Mar. 14, 2013), 
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 163. See Morgan, supra note 3. 
 164. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
 165. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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to lessen the disproportionate effect on petitioners while pro-
tecting patent owners from duplicative arguments to invalidate 
their patents. 
A. THE BEST ESTOPPEL INTERPRETATION IS BROAD WITH AN 
EXCEPTION FOR PRIOR ART THE PATENT OWNER HIDES 
Judges should interpret IPR’s estoppel provision to prevent 
petitioners from raising any printed publications and patents to 
invalidate a patent on novel or nonobvious grounds in district 
court, so long as the patent owner did not maliciously hide this 
prior art.
166
 As discussed, inventions must be novel under 35 
U.S.C. § 102 to receive patent protection, and IPR allows peti-
tioners to use patents and printed publications to destroy nov-
elty.
167
 In an egregious case, a patent owner could gain posses-
sion of the only copy of a printed publication and deliberately 
withhold it. If a patent owner possessed this prior art, but ma-
liciously hid this evidence, a court should not estop a petitioner 
from raising this evidence in a future forum if the petitioner 
discovers this prior art. This interpretation is in accord with 
the plain language of the statute because the petitioner cannot 
reasonably find prior art that is deliberately hidden. One could 
argue that this interpretation does not reflect the change of 
“raised or could have raised” to “reasonably raised or could 
have raised,” but ensuring an exception for when the patent 
owner hides prior art effectuates the statutory change in lan-
guage. 
Further, a broad estoppel interpretation is the best for the 
patent litigation system.
168
 Specifically, a broad estoppel inter-
pretation forces petitioners to choose their best arguments 
carefully, as in typical federal litigation. This interpretation is 
fairest for owners of legitimate patent rights because it protects 
them from facing duplicative arguments in subsequent litiga-
tion.
169
 Further, as the PTAB is already predisposed to invali-
date patents, a broad estoppel interpretation preserves judicial 
efficiency.
170
 Finally, a broad estoppel interpretation with an 
exception for hidden prior art leads to predictability for both 
the patent owner and petitioner.
171
 
 
 166. See supra Part II.B. 
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B. PROCEDURAL CHANGES MUST BE ENACTED TO PREVENT 
DISPARATE EFFECTS ON PETITIONERS FROM A BROAD ESTOPPEL 
INTERPRETATION 
While a broad estoppel interpretation is best, there are still 
procedural factors that make a broad estoppel interpretation 
especially burdensome for petitioners. As discussed, these pri-
marily are the limited time-to-file for IPR and the PTAB’s prac-
tice of denying redundant arguments even when they meet the 
heightened institution standard.
172
 To fix these problems, Con-
gress or the courts should require heightened notice pleading to 
provide defendants with better information regarding the 
claims asserted against them and prohibit the PTAB from 
denying institution on arguments it deems redundant.
173
 
First, when courts estop nearly all invalidity arguments in 
subsequent litigation, petitioners are unfairly prejudiced be-
cause they lack sufficient time to prepare arguments for the 
PTAB.
174
 Congress recognized this issue when drafting the 
America Invents Act. The original time limit for filing for IPR 
was six months from the date of service of an infringement law-
suit,
175
 but recognizing this was too short of a time, Congress 
extended the time-to-file to twelve months.
176
 However, some 
argue even a year is not long enough, and instead suggest link-
ing the deadline to file for IPR to the Markman decision when 
the judge construes the claims.
177
 Thus, petitioners would have 
time to determine how to best challenge the claims in IPR after 
the district court rules on the claims’ meanings. 
Ultimately, however, tying the deadline to file to the 
Markman decision would likely be too complex and inefficient. 
Each district court has its own procedure for the Markman 
hearing, as this is a judicially created procedure.
178
 While courts 
with larger patent dockets wait until meaningful discovery is 
 
 172. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 173. See generally Dennis Crouch, Heightened Pleading Requirements: Pa-
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(Feb. 11, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/02/heightened-requirements 
-conference.html (discussing possible solutions for modifying patent litigation 
to require heightened notice pleading like other types of civil litigation). 
 174. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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complete, other courts construe claims earlier.
179
 If Congress 
tied the time to file to the Markman decision, this could lead to 
variable results where some parties have spent more resources 
on discovery than parties in other districts.
180
 Further, even if 
Congress tied the time to file for IPR to the Markman decision, 
Congress would still need to give additional time for parties to 
construct arguments after the judge releases her Markman 
construction. Overall, tying the time to file to the Markman de-
cision may lead to judicial inefficiency since “[s]ome courts don’t 
even hold a Markman hearing until [] a week or so before the 
trial,” and then parties will have already completed all discov-
ery.
181
 This would be unfair to the parties.
182
  
The better solution would be for Congress or the courts to 
require plaintiffs to state which claims are allegedly infringed. 
During the 113th Congress, there were several bills that set 
forth heightened pleading standards for patent infringement.
183
 
The House passed one such bill, Representative Goodlatte’s 
“Innovation Act,” which required plaintiffs “to identify the pa-
tents and claims infringed,” and to specify “exactly how they 
are infringed.”
184
 Senator Leahy, however, pulled the bill’s 
counterpart in the Senate, so reform against abusive patent lit-
igation did not pass in the 113th Congress.
185
 While reform did 
not pass in the previous Congress, preeminent patent scholar 
Dennis Crouch predicts that the new Republican legislature 
will pass the Innovation Act in 2015.
186
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The Supreme Court may also have the opportunity to raise 
pleading standards in patent litigation.
187
 The Judicial Confer-
ence Advisory Committee is now considering eliminating Form 
18 and requiring patent litigation to adhere to typical civil liti-
gation notice pleading.
188
 If the committee approves eliminating 
Form 18, the Supreme Court will eventually need to approve 
this measure as well.
189
 Action by either Congress or the Court 
will help defendants have adequate knowledge to construct ar-
guments for their IPR petitions. Then, petitioners are less dis-
advantaged by a broad estoppel interpretation since they have 
ample notice of which invalidity contentions they need to cre-
ate.  
The second main way in which a broad estoppel interpreta-
tion disadvantages petitioners is the PTAB’s denial of redun-
dant arguments.
190
 Congress should clarify the IPR procedural 
rules and prohibit denial based solely on redundant grounds. 
Multiple petitioners have argued the PTAB does not have the 
authority to deny arguments solely for being redundant.
191
 The 
PTAB argues it has this authority because it needs to complete 
IPR proceedings within twelve months.
192
 Still, when parties 
pay for a petition and the IPR institution standard does not 
mention denial based on redundant grounds, parties deserve a 
full review of their arguments. There may need to be more 
PTAB judges to ensure they finish IPRs within a year, but this 
is the proper interpretation of the statutory rules.
193
 
These solutions will effectuate Congress’s intent for enact-
ing the America Invents Act by making IPR the primary cost-
effective vehicle for invalidating low-quality patents.
194
 A broad 
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interpretation of estoppel is best for effective patent litigation, 
but requiring better notice pleading and prohibiting the PTAB 
from denying redundant arguments ensures petitioners will be 
able to fairly use IPR.  
  CONCLUSION   
Problems with patent litigation are impeding the purpose 
of the constitutionally created patent system, to promote tech-
nological progress. Companies face numerous low-quality pa-
tents, a rise in the total number of patent litigation suits, a rise 
in the cost of such suits, and abusive litigation tactics by some 
plaintiffs. Congress thus created IPR, intending to give defend-
ants an efficient and inexpensive alternative to traditional fed-
eral litigation. IPR must coexist with federal patent litigation, 
however, so Congress drafted an estoppel provision to prevent 
unnecessary duplicative litigation for patent owners. 
Patent practitioners are currently unsure of how future 
courts will apply estoppel from IPR. Of the possible interpreta-
tions, the best interpretation from a statutory and policy view-
point is to estop parties from using any and all printed publica-
tions and patents to challenge the validity of a patent in a 
future forum on novel and nonobvious grounds, not including 
any prior art a patent owner hides. However, due to procedural 
factors of IPR, a broad interpretation detrimentally affects peti-
tioners. The detrimental effects could prevent petitioners from 
filing for IPR and thwart Congress’s intent of making IPR an 
attractive alternative to federal litigation. Thus, Congress or 
the Supreme Court should require heightened notice pleading 
by plaintiffs in federal litigation, and Congress should prohibit 
the PTAB from denying redundant arguments when they oth-
erwise meet the requirements needed for IPR. Overall, a broad 
estoppel interpretation and procedural fixes for petitioners will 
effectuate Congress’s desire in improving the patent system to 
promote progress. 
